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Abstract 
Complex IT projects pose particular challenges for the application of control, because of the 
dynamism and uncertainty involved. Prior studies suggest self-control can complement formal 
control within complex projects. However, how managers can enact controlee self-control remains 
an unsolved question. This paper proposes and investigates how enacted formal control unfolds 
during the course of an IT project and, in particular, how formal control enactment can promote or 
hinder controlee self-control. We demonstrate through case studies of a control in two wireless 
communication product development projects that an enabling control style can induce controlees to 
act to the benefit of both the controller and the controlee, while an authoritative control style 
encourages controlees’ self-interested behavior. We also show how controlees influence the 
enactment of control within complex projects and demonstrate the reinforcing effects of the 
controller’s enactment and controlee response on project outcomes. For practice, this research 
identifies preconditions necessary for inducing controlee self-control.  
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1 Introduction 
When complex projects are initiated, there is often no 
precise vision of the resulting product/system and no 
detailed specifications of the project tasks or a clear 
route to achieve project goals (Ahern, Leavy, & Byrne, 
2014; Baccarini, 1996; Tatikonda & Rosenthal, 2000). 
New product development integrating new software and 
hardware is one form of complex project. Technology 
solutions of this type, such as internet of things (IoT) 
solutions (e.g., networked wireless communication 
products) are becoming commonplace. Such complex 
IT projects require the adoption of control practices 
from both product development as well as IS 
development (Tarafdar & Tanriverdi, 2018). 
Controlee self-control is particularly important for such 
complex IT projects. Controlee self-control allows the 
“man on the spot” (i.e., the controlee) (Hayek, 1945, p. 
524) to make decisions that cannot be addressed by 
prespecified controls. However, how managers can 
enact controlee self-control remains an unsolved 
question. Increasingly, empirical evidence suggests 
formal control is somehow related to controlee self-
control (Grabski & Leech, 2007; Gulati & Puranam, 
2009; Henderson & Lee, 1992; Huber, Fischer, Dibbern, 
& Hirschheim, 2013; Tiwana & Keil, 2009; Wiener et 
al., 2016). For example, in the context of 79 internal IS 
projects, Tiwana and Keil (2009) noted that both formal 
control (behavior control) and self-control contribute to 
effective project performance; Grabski and Leech (2007) 
found formal control and self-control statistically 
interact to explain the success of an internal IS project. 
However, the actual processual relationship between the 
two modes of control remains unknown (Gopal & 
Gosain, 2010; Tiwana, 2010). Often, controllers rely on 
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selection/recruitment processes to choose controlees 
who have the abilities and knowledge to exercise self-
control (e.g., through screening or performance 
evaluation processes) (Choudhury & Sabherwal, 2003; 
Kirsch et al., 2002). We argue that part of the answer lies 
in the way that formal control is enacted. 
An enacted view of control sees control enacted by the 
controller as an ongoing process (Orlikowski & Iacono, 
2000). It is through the control enactment and controlee 
response that control comes into existence. One key 
aspect of control enactment is the controller control style, 
i.e., the manner by which controllers exercise their 
authority to shape controlees’ experience of control (vs. 
the control itself that regulates controlees’ behaviors) 
(Wiener et al., 2016). This paper studies such formal 
control enactment in a comparative case study of two 
wireless communication product development projects 
(i.e., IoT solutions) in which a newly implemented 
formal control (i.e., a checklist) was enacted in distinct 
ways, leading to distinct controlee responses. 
In many complex projects, it is impossible to a priori 
specify all necessary controlee behaviors—there are 
often situational contingencies specific to the project 
that might possibly happen and cause problems (i.e., the 
situational contingency-formal control gap). These 
contingencies may arise from a project’s environment 
and/or structures and procedures employed in a project 
(Engwall, 2003). Clearly, to achieve controller goals, it 
is necessary to address situational contingencies. This 
paper’s principal contribution is a process model 
showing how the controller’s different enactment of a 
formal control encourages particular controlee 
responses and vice versa, ultimately leading to the gap 
between the situational contingencies and formal control 
either being bridged by controlee self-control or being 
exploited for controlees’ self-protection purpose only. 
The model explains how formal control can lead to 
controlee self-control, by highlighting the importance of 
an enactment of formal control in an enabling style (as 
opposed to an authoritative one). Enacting control in an 
enabling style involves the provision to controlees of 
contingent information (i.e., transparency) and the right 
to make decisions (i.e., repair). This creates a safe space 
and a collaborative culture for controlees to take 
independent, creative actions. When unspecified issues 
emerge, the controlee is able to exercise self-control to 
experiment with new behaviors to resolve these issues, 
leading to the situational contingency-formal control 
gap being bridged. Conversely, controlee self-control 
does not arise when formal controls are enacted in an 
authoritative style to the point where maladaptation and 
tension result. Here, the controlee attempts to protect 
him- or herself by performing behaviors the controlee 
feels will minimize punishment, rather than exploring 
new behaviors to address issues. The model provides 
practical recommendations for the controller to facilitate 
controlee self-control. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 
2, we review the relevant literature on organizational 
control and an enacted view of control. We continue 
with a description of the methodology in Chapter 3. Our 
findings are presented in Chapter 4, followed by a 
discussion in Chapter 5. Finally, some limitations to this 
study are noted and conclusions are drawn in Chapter 6. 
2 Background Literature 
The study of control has a long history in organization 
studies (Braverman, 1974; Jaworski, 1988; Ouchi, 1979, 
1980). However, most research has focused on control 
in routine and permanent organizations (Wiener et al., 
2016). One important contribution of contemporary IS 
research is to adapt the organization control literature to 
the nonroutine and temporary context of IS projects, 
leading to behavioral control theory (Choudhury & 
Sabherwal, 2003; Chua, Lim, Soh, & Sia, 2012; Kirsch, 
1997; Mähring, 2002; Wiener, Remus, Heumann, & 
Mähring, 2015). 
Within behavioral control theory, control refers to any 
attempt by a controller to ensure that a controlee acts 
according to predefined strategies to achieve 
organizational objectives (Kirsch, 1997). Researchers 
have identified two principal modes of control, formal 
and informal control. Formal control relies on the 
controller’s hierarchical authority to monitor, evaluate 
and reward the controlee. There are three “sub” modes 
of formal control: input, behavior (process) and outcome 
(output) control (Eisenhardt, 1985; Govindarajan & 
Fisher, 1990; Kirsch, 1996, 1997; Ouchi, 1979; Wiener 
et al., 2016). Input control involves the management of 
human, financial and material project resources 
allocated by the controller. The controlee is rewarded or 
punished for his/her ability to utilize those resources. 
Behavior control prescribes rules and procedures. The 
controlee is rewarded or punished, depending on how 
faithfully procedures are followed. Outcome control 
prescribes the desired outcomes or goals and the 
controlee is rewarded/punished for meeting/failing 
goals. 
Informal control is noted by the absence of the use of 
hierarchical authority to monitor, evaluate and reward. 
There are likewise two “sub” modes of informal control, 
clan and self-control (Jaworski, 1988; Kirsch, 1996; 
Kirsch & Cummings, 1996; Ouchi, 1980). Clan control 
and its equivalents of “cultural control,” “normative 
control,” (Fleming & Sturdy, 2011; Kunda, 1992) or 
“concertive control” (Barker, 1993) refer to 
proscriptions of behavior based on norms, ceremonies, 
and shared experiences, with particular significance 
placed on emotional relations of unity and solidarity 
with the organization or colleagues (Alvesson & 
Kärreman, 2007; Costas, 2012; Ouchi, 1980). Clan 
control works by socializing controlees to common 
norms or values (Ouchi, 1980). The “power source” of 
formal and clan control is external to the self. Controlees 




are regulated either through the application of 
hierarchical authority (i.e., formal control) or 
institutions, or norms (i.e., clan control). Self-control, in 
contrast, refers to proscriptions of behavior managed by 
the self. It is commonly understood to be self-chosen 
and carries the connotations of individualism and self-
actualization (Maruping, Venkatesh, & Agarwal, 2009; 
Ryan & Deci, 2000b; Wiener et al., 2015). 
Substantive research has been done on formal control in 
organizations (Gopal & Gosain, 2010; Gregory & Keil, 
2014; Heumann et al., 2015; Keil et al., 2014; Wiener et 
al., 2016). An increasing stream of research has 
acknowledged the risks associated with excessive 
formal control (e.g., operating delays, bureaucratic 
inefficiency, adaptive limits) and the need to leverage 
the unique strengths of informal control (Huber et al., 
2013; Lioliou et al., 2014). Recent studies demonstrate 
that formal control can be enacted to induce clan control 
by creating/leveraging social capital (Chua et al., 2012; 
Kirsch, Ko, & Haney, 2010). However, research results 
on the interplay between formal and self-control are 
sparse and inconclusive. Some suggest that formal 
control impedes self-control because formal control 
signals a lack of trust (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). Others 
argue that formal control can facilitate self-control by 
increasing interaction for building trust (Huber et al., 
2013) or clarifying project boundaries (Kirsch & 
Cummings, 1996). There is a need for more in-depth 
research explaining how formal control unfolds and 
relates to self-control. We aim to fill this gap by studying 
the way control is enacted. 
2.1 An Enacted View of Control 
By enacting a control, we mean bringing it into 
existence by means of action (Weick, 1995). Control is 
not merely a mechanism selected and implemented by 
the controller. Controlee action is also essential for 
realizing the potential of the selected control toward the 
fulfillment of controller goals (i.e., goals the controller 
wants to achieve through implementation of control). 
Control is thus an ongoing production by both the 
controller and controlee (Orlikowski & Iacono, 2000). 
The resulting outcome is essentially the product of both 
the controller’s (control enactment) and controlee’s 
making (controlee response) (Chua & Myers, 2018; 
Weick, 1995). 
When controllers enact controls, they set or clarify rules, 
define the conditions for the controlee to act in, and 
employ a specific vocabulary of motives. For example, 
given a standard operating procedure (SOP), an 
employee may perform a task incorrectly and receive a 
verbal reprimand. This reprimand can take a number of 
forms. The controller could denigrate the controlee 
without clarifying the fault and threaten the controlee 
with severe punishment if any deviation happens again. 
Alternately, the controller could explain the fault and 
encourage the controlee to propose improvements to the 
SOP. In both cases, the same control is employed, but 
the control is enacted differently. Indeed, the controller 
can enact a control to create positive (e.g., clarification 
of rules) or negative (e.g., psychological distress) 
conditions for controlee task performance. 
Likewise, the control enacted by a controller does not 
fully determine a controlee’s actions (Chua & Myers, 
2018). When the controller enacts a control, he or she 
creates a space in which the controlee can perform an 
action. The controlee’s response could be one of a range 
of possibilities, which creates consequences that are  
intended or unintended by the controller. Continuing 
with the same example, as a result of the verbal 
reprimand, the controlee could choose to be more 
careful (i.e., intended by the controller), or could feel 
resentful and deliberately sabotage work in a way that 
could not be traced to him or her (i.e., unintended by the 
controller) (Prasad & Prasad, 2000).  
2.2 A Preliminary Analytical Model  
To account for the aforementioned duality between 
control enactment and controlee response, a temporal 
model is required for structuring the process. When a 
controller enacts a new control, this causes changes to 
extant patterns of action. The full implications of these 
changes are not immediate, as controlees need to 
reinterpret the situation and respond (Van de Ven & 
Poole, 1995). Furthermore, the actual outcomes of these 
changes may be uncertain (Merton, 1936). We therefore 
model the enactment process sequentially, without 
presuming any specific progressive developmental logic 
(Barley, 1986; Langley, 1999). Figure 1 presents our 
theorization of the relationship between control 
enactment and controlee response. In the figure, the 
enactment of formal control occurs in temporal episodes 
(E1, E2, E3, etc.). Both the controller’s enactment and 
the controlee’s response shape the context.  
The controller’s enactment shapes the context, because 
the control itself is now part of the context. Both the 
controller and controlee must make future decisions 
based on the existence of this control. For example, a 
controller offers a $1 bounty for every bug found in 
someone else’s code. This, however, leads to collusion 
among developers who deliberately insert easy-to-find 
bugs in their code so that everyone gets the bounty. The 
controller then has to enact new controls in this new 
context, for example, by declaring that in instances 
where there are more than 10 bugs per module, the 
developer who created the bug has to pay the bounty. 
Control thus presents the controller and controlee with 
opportunities to reciprocally shape their context. The 
variety of ways through which the controller may enact 
formal control and the controlee may respond to control 
enactment under evolving contextual situations is the 
focus of our analysis. 




Figure 1. A Preliminary Analytical Model 
2.2.1 Control Enactment  
The controller can choose to emphasize formal control 
through the use of threats or sanctions, or through 
choice and feedback (Deci & Ryan, 1987). The way 
the controller enacts control can shape controlees’ 
psychological reaction (Steinberg, 2005) and attitudes 
toward a control (Ryan & Deci, 2000b). This in turn 
shapes their behaviors. The controller can enact control 
in two distinct styles: enabling and authoritative 
(Wiener et al., 2016), representing the two extreme 
ends of a continuum. The enabling style, and similar 
styles of “responsible autonomy” (Friedman, 1990) 
and “quasi-autonomous pattern” (Alvesson & 
Willmott, 2002), recognizes that the controlee is 
intelligent and that not all tasks are programmable. 
Therefore, when adopting the enabling style, the 
controller focuses on mobilizing the controlee’s 
capacity to exercise discretion to attain controller goals. 
In contrast, the authoritative style, and its similar styles 
of “direct control” (Friedman, 1990) and “managerial 
pattern” (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002), is top-down, 
unyielding, and punitive (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004). 
The focus of the authoritative style is on controlee 
compliance through detailed specification of tasks and 
close supervision. 
Two features distinguish the enabling from the 
authoritative style, namely transparency and repair 
(Adler & Borys, 1996; Wiener et al., 2016). In 
transparency, information about control activities and 
the context are provided to controlees to develop their 
understanding as to how formal control facilitates 
controller goals and how their tasks relate to these 
goals (Adler & Borys, 1996). However, instead of 
having information randomly pushed toward the 
controlee, the information is made available on 
demand and is made intelligible to the controlee. For 
example, the controller makes available related 
information on a shared server and categorizes it to 
make it easy for controlees to navigate (e.g., by 
organizing Excel worksheets in temporal order). In 
contrast, controllers that adopt the authoritative style 
treat controls as assertive instructions or prescriptions, 
keeping information about the context and control 
activities from controlees (Wiener et al., 2016). 
Information distributed by authoritative-style 
controllers is meant to determine and structure 
controlee behavior and put constraints on controlee 
judgment (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002). For example, 
a controller issues a policy and takes away controlees’ 
rights to challenge it. 
Repair is concerned with deviations and breakdowns 
in control activities. A controller adopting the enabling 
style anticipates breakdowns and appreciates the 
controlee’s potential contribution to repair them. The 
enabling style views formal control as an imperfect 
tool for achieving controller goals. The controlee is 
given discretion to disregard control when judgment is 
required (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; Hoy & Sweetland, 
2001; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). For example, 
when controlees realize that a requirement is more 
complex than anticipated, they discuss changes to the 
project schedule with the controller. In contrast, 
authoritative-style controllers anticipate no deviations 
and fear controlee opportunism more than their 
potential contribution to fix breakdowns; they enact 
control to ensure compliance under all circumstances 
(Adler & Borys, 1996; Ashforth, 1997; Cooper & 
Taylor, 2000). For example, a controlee is penalized if 
he or she is unable to make a deadline even though the 




issue concerning the requirement is more complex than 
initially estimated. In the authoritative style, threats 
and sanctions are frequently used to minimize 
deviations (Huebner, 2003). 
2.2.2 Controlee Response 
Given the enacted control, the controlee can choose to 
embrace the goals intended by the control (i.e., a 
precursor to self-control) or can consider such goals to 
be external and separate from the controlee’s goals. 
External control means controlees perform an activity 
because they feel external pressure to perform the 
activity (e.g., formal control, clan control). They have 
no intrinsic desire to perform the activity. When a 
controlee responds to controls as external, the 
controlee expends relatively little capacity (e.g., 
energy, cognitive resources) to execute commands 
because the controller or peer is charged with setting 
the goals or rules, monitoring the controlee’s 
performance, and taking actions to reward or punish 
the controlee. In contrast, self-control requires a 
controlee to set his or her own goals, monitor the 
difference between the actual state and the goals, and 
take actions to close the gap accordingly (Baumeister, 
2002; Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; de Ridder et al., 
2012; Vohs et al., 2014). Self-control comprises three 
factors: self-goal setting, self-monitoring, and intrinsic 
motivation (Baumeister, 2002; Baumeister & 
Heatherton, 1996; Kirsch, 1996; Kirsch & Cummings, 
1996). 
Self-goals are the desired outcomes or ideals set up by 
the controlee (Baumeister, 2002). The goals can direct 
attention, mobilize efforts, increase persistence and 
motivate personal action toward goals not prescribed 
by the controller (Latham & Locke, 1991). For 
example, an employee wants to achieve a certain 
standard of performance because this would give them 
a positive feeling. While goals are usually set up by the 
controller, the controlee can internalize or derive 
higher goals from said controller goals. For example, a 
project member decides to submit deliverables earlier 
than required by management. At the workplace, a 
defined performance standard, quota (the amount of 
work or production), time limit, or budget for 
completing a task can influence a controlee’s goals and 
become internalized. 
Self-monitoring involves systematic information 
gathering about one’s own behavior and comparing the 
actual state with the ideal standard. For example, office 
workers attempting to achieve a specified level of 
energy saving must monitor their own energy 
consumption patterns (Yun et al., 2013). Self-
monitoring is critical to self-control because it allows 
the controlee to obtain important information for the 
regulation of personal behavior (Baumeister, 2002; 
Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Miller, 1987). 
Substantial empirical work has demonstrated the 
necessity of self-monitoring. For example, the failure 
to monitor posture while performing typing tasks or 
assembly tasks means that safe posturing does not 
occur (Gravina et al., 2008). Similarly, when forklift 
drivers failed to monitor their performance, time spent 
on-task increased (Ludwig & Goomas, 2009). 
Intrinsic motivation is the most important element of 
self-control (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Manz, 
1986; Manz & Sims Jr., 1987). To be motivated means 
to be moved to do something. Without motivation, 
self-goal setting and self-monitoring are insufficient 
for inducing self-control. Motivation can be either 
intrinsic or extrinsic (Ryan & Deci, 2000b). Intrinsic 
motivation exists when tasks are interesting, enjoyable, 
or satisfy the innate psychological need of competence 
(Harter, 1978), autonomy or relatedness (Baumeister 
& Leary, 1995). Nidumolu and Subramani (2003) 
found that intrinsic motivation facilitated self-control 
in software developers. Extrinsic motivation occurs 
when performing a request allows a person to obtain a 
separable outcome, such as to satisfy an external 
demand or obtain some reward (Ryan & Deci, 2000a). 
2.2.3 Context  
Controllers and controlees are embedded in a context 
that has other preexisting controls (Choudhury & 
Sabherwal, 2003; Kirsch, 1997). These other controls 
along with noncontrol factors (e.g., parallel events, 
organizational politics, institutionalized routines) 
constitute the context that shapes and is shaped by the 
controller’s and controlee’s actions. 
First, there is a conglomeration of controls of different 
origins and disparate ages in the organization. While 
some may be tailored to a specific task, others originate 
from separate functions or professional communities. 
While some endure for a long time, others are only 
enacted for a brief duration (e.g., the life of the project). 
For example, the employee’s employment contract and 
dictates from the human resources department all 
influence controlee behavior. If existing controls align 
with controller goals, there is a strong probability that 
controlee behaviors will likewise align with these 
goals. If not, inefficiency, conflicts of interest, and 
confusion about the contradiction between what these 
controls dictate and actual behavioral patterns on the 
part of the controlee will probably exist. It is also likely 
that the controller can improve the situation by 
removing or relaxing some controls or the controlee 
can resist or work around the controls. 
Second, there are many noncontrol factors that occur 
simultaneously with control enactment and controlee 
response (e.g., other projects) (Engwall, 2003), or that 
accumulate from prior interaction (e.g., trust) (Huber 
et al., 2013). These factors require resources and 
energy to deal with and sometimes produce outputs of 
little utility or even negative consequences. For 
The Reinforcing Effects of Formal Control Enactment  
 
317 
example, a controlee tasked to work on project A might 
be distracted by his work on project B, especially if 
project B is late. In other words, project B drains the 
controlee’s energy and motivation to work on project 
A. However, the controller can help conserve the 
controlee’s energy by rescheduling project B or 
allocating extra resources. 
Clearly, control can become outdated and fail in 
changing circumstances. Control can thus impede 
performance and can cause negative feelings such as 
stress or alienation (Chua & Myers, 2018). Yet self-
controlled controlees will take the initiative to set self-
goals that are aligned with controller goals and monitor 
said goals, regardless of situational contingencies. 
Self-control can thus complement formal control to 
address any project-specific situation for achieving 
controller goals. We refer to the possibility that formal 
control can misspecify behavior in specific situations 
as the situational contingency-formal control gap. This 
gap can be potentially bridged by self-control. 
3 Methodology 
To develop a process model about control enactment, 
we followed an exploratory multiple-case research 
approach (Dubé & Paré, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 
2003). This is an incremental, theory-building 
approach where researchers generate and augment 
insights about control enactment by iterating between 
theory and data. We entered the field with the 
preliminary model and constructs in Figure 1. The first 
researcher was engaged in collecting data about the 
two cases and theorizing; the second researcher carried 
on with the theorizing but did not participate in data 
collection. Incidents in each case were constantly 
compared with each other, between the two cases, and 
with theory. 
In this study, the same control mechanism was applied 
to two product development projects in the same 
organization in two distinct ways. In one project, the 
controller enacted formal control to enable staff to 
exercise self-control, benefiting both the controller and 
controlee; in the other, the controller enacted the 
control to prompt controlee action. However, enacted 
controlee action was only for the purpose of self-
protection. 
3.1 Site Description and the 
Manufacturability Readiness Review 
The study was conducted at a large manufacturer 
(hereinafter designated as MassCo). MassCo designs 
and manufactures wireless communication products 
that embed both software and hardware to develop new 
product features/functionality (e.g., TV boxes that 
stream video on demand). Thus, software engineering 
was a critical element of each product. Its headquarters 
are in Taiwan and it has production sites across Asia. 
MassCo employs about 1500 employees worldwide 
and has six major business units. Given the distribution 
of manufacturing sites in Asia, a manufacturing center 
(hereinafter called “the Center”) was established to 
coordinate and control production. The two product 
development projects studied were part of the Center, 
comprising 45 engineers (e.g., mechanical engineers, 
product engineers) working in an open-plan office. 
These engineers had undergone distinct training 
associated with their areas of specialization. Engineers 
also tended to work on specific product lines.  
Therefore, the same groups of engineers tended to work 
together over time, being responsible for separate issues 
associated with production planning and pilot 
production of new products. Apart from formal control, 
the engineers had professional autonomy based on their 
collective or individual competence. Their daily 
routines required that they make many “judgment calls” 
(mechanical engineer, Project Beta) to deal with issues 
emerging from the shop floor. 
Table 1. The MRR’s Major Functions in Different Technical Areas 
Technical area Description 
Product design Guides engineers through the process of verifying/testing product design, both hardware and 
software (e.g., PCB assembly, mechanical assembly, and underlying software programs). 
Machinery Guides engineers through the process of programming for process automation and reviewing 
equipment and fixtures needed, including their capacity, availability, and performance. 
Workmanship Guides engineers through the process of reviewing manpower needed (e.g., operators, 
maintenance technicians, training) 
Materials Guides engineers through the process of reviewing materials needed, e.g., PCBs, electronic parts, 
mechanical parts, packing materials, etc. 
Production procedures Guides engineers through the process of verifying/testing standard operating procedures. 
Routine reports Generates reports of pilot production outcomes in tabular/chart format. 





Note: Bold fonts indicate major actors during the pilot production stage. 
Figure 2. Chart of Project Organization During Pilot Production  
It is often the case that poor performance tends to 
encourage the controller to enact more controls 
(Choudhury & Sabherwal, 2003). In an attempt to raise 
the yield rates (i.e., ratio of good units produced) of new 
products at MassCo, a new control was enacted called 
the Manufacturability Readiness Review (MRR) for the 
purpose of better control over the pilot production 
process. This took the form of a checklist with multiple 
worksheets encapsulated in a Microsoft Excel 
workbook designed to verify production- and design-
related problems. The MRR was both an outcome and 
behavior control. It aimed at regulating the pilot 
production outputs (e.g., yield rates) and activities 
associated with generic design/production requirements 
of all products at MassCo. The MRR was arranged in 
temporal order with items on the same worksheets that 
could be executed simultaneously. The controller could 
easily reorganize the checklist for information 
processing/transmission. Table 1 lists the major MRR 
functions in different technical areas. 
At MassCo, most production issues, including those 
related to materials and production procedures were 
specified by designers in the bills of materials (BOM) 
and preliminary SOP. The engineers then applied their 
technical skills to perform routine checks. One intent of 
the MRR was to increase engineers’ early participation 
in product analysis by requiring them to audit product 
design, including both hardware and software and “their 
integration” (surface mount technology engineer, 
Project Alpha). The product design function required 
engineers to apply in-depth domain knowledge to detect 
design errors early to reduce modification and 
production cost. For example, items on the checklist 
about the position of components (e.g., angles or 
distance from other components, or external covers) 
were introduced to encourage engineers to use their 
judgment to prevent undesired outcomes, such as 
damage to or interference with other components, 
unstable assembly, or even functional failure. Items 
about software testing (e.g., associated parameters, 
versions, procedures, hardware support/deployment) 
were also included to allow engineers to better manage 
the process and identify causes of execution failure (e.g., 
software bugs, testing methods, or hardware design). 
The idea was that the engineer could compare pilot 
production preparation against an MRR item, and then 
check off each item after the process was executed. 
Once all processes were executed, the MRR was passed 
to one of MassCo’s production sites for volume 
production. The MRR checklist was linked to engineers’ 
annual appraisals. If a project resulted in volume 
production problems and the engineer failed to execute 
and check off corresponding items, that engineer could 
not be higher than the 60th percentile in performance 
evaluations. 
3.1.1 Control Relationship 
New product development at MassCo followed a 
sequential process, with the product engineer taking 
control once the project entered the pilot production 
stage. Generally, product engineers were charged with 
overseeing production (including pilot production) to 
meet an overall schedule set by the project manager and 
performance indicators by the Center. The MRR thus 
was the most comprehensive of many controls that the 
product engineer could apply to monitor the project. 
Figure 2 depicts various stakeholders in a product 
development project and their formal relationships as 
controllers and controlees. During the pilot production 
stage, the major actors included the engineer (controlee), 
and product engineer (controller) who directly 
controlled the engineer or mediated the influence of 
other controllers on the engineer. In Project Alpha, the 
controller was a senior technical manager. 
Controller
Product engineer (a 
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3.2 Data Collection  
The first author was invited to study the MRR adoption 
by the Center director. She entered the field site in May, 
about five months after the MRR rollout, and stayed 
until November 2009 to collect retrospective data. The 
first author visited the field at fortnightly intervals and 
stayed for half a day or longer to collect data on each 
visit. Because the MRR was mainly associated with 
three engineering functions, the first author focused on 
getting information from these three engineering 
sections (i.e., surface mount technology, mechanical 
engineering, and product engineering). The senior 
technical manager who led the first project (Project 
Alpha) suggested it as a case study to the first author. 
Data about how control enactment unfolded in Project 
Alpha was collected within one month of its 
completion. As data collection continued, the theme of 
self-control emerged, as we noticed the engineers 
voluntarily monitored their own performance and set 
challenging goals for themselves. 
To extend and test our understanding of how and why 
formal control can be enacted to lead to controlee self-
control, we needed to examine a project where the 
MRR was poorly enacted, in accordance with the 
principles of theoretical sampling in which contrasting 
results occurred (Eisenhardt, 1989; Lee, 1989; Yin, 
2003). The senior technical manager provided a list of 
recent projects (both finished and ongoing ones). The 
first author screened these projects looking for 
incomplete MRR checklists. An incomplete MRR 
checklist signaled the MRR was not enacted in line 
with controller goals. It was thus a proxy for outcomes 
unintended by the controller. Initially, the researcher 
flagged two ongoing projects as potential contrasting 
cases. After the projects finished, the researcher 
solicited the MRR checklist of these projects through 
the assistance of the senior technical manager. Project 
Beta featured the most improperly filled checklists 
(demonstrating unsatisfactory MRR enactment). 
Therefore, it was chosen for comparison with Project 
Alpha (Yin, 2003). In terms of similarities, both 
projects employed the MRR to control production and 
both had similar numbers of engineers and two 
designers: Project Alpha involved seven engineers, 
while Project Beta had nine. Both projects had 
engineers with similar types of work experience (see 
the information for industry and company tenure in 
Table 2). Both the senior technical manager in Project 
Alpha and the product engineer in Project Beta had 
formal authority to implement the MRR as a controller. 
The similarities between the projects allowed for the 
replication/extension of emergent theory (Eisenhardt, 
1989). 
For each project, data were collected through 
interviews, internal control documents, and site visits. 
The predominant method of data collection was in-
depth interviews at the site over a period of seven 
months. The first author conducted semistructured 
interviews with interviewees from different 
organizational levels (management and 
nonmanagement) and engineering sections. Questions 
were asked about interviewees’ positions and roles 
within the organization. Then, questions were asked 
about the processes of the new product project from a 
project management perspective. Such questions 
focused on general control and coordination problems 
in new product projects. Finally, specific questions 
about the MRR enacted in the pilot production process 
were asked. Such questions included those on 
facilitation, performance standards, monitoring, 
reward/punishment, and consequences associated with 
the MRR implementation. Overall, interviews lasted 
between one and two hours and were recorded and 
transcribed verbatim. A total of 17 interviews with 13 
interviewees were conducted in MassCo’s Taiwan 
premises. Table 2 summarizes the interviewees’ 
background information for both projects. 
The collected control documents contained 569 pages 
of data and included MRR checklists for each project, 
including meeting minutes, orientation and training 
materials, engineering change requests, and email 
communication. We also reviewed engineering design 
drawings, meeting presentation slides and other project 
documents. In many cases, the documents helped 
illuminate and clarify earlier insights drawn from 
interviews. They alerted the first author to important 
leads to pursue or contradictions to understand and 
allowed inferences to be made about the agendas and 
interests of the various actors. For example, in an email 
thread on a minor production issue, a product engineer 
carbon copied the email to an SMT (surface mount 
technology) engineer’s direct supervisor to ensure his 
compliance. The behavior pattern we observed in the 
email exchange corresponded with our interview data. 
Documents also helped ameliorate the retrospective 
nature of the interviews. We could cross-index 
statements made by the interviewees, making it easier 
to establish when events actually occurred, because of 
the date/time stamps on the documents. 
During site visits, the first author observed the site 
layout, and the interaction between participants. Site 
visits were arranged before interviews started so that 
the first author could gain a preliminary understanding 
of the site. For example, the first author, wearing a 
cleanroom suit, was accompanied by the Center 
director on visits to assembly lines and cells in 
MassCo’s Taiwan facilities. After data collection 
started, the first author sometimes went into town with 
interviewees for meals. Field notes were taken on the 
day of the visit. They included notes on informal 
conversations, drawings of the site, the researcher’s 
reflections and further questions to be pursued. 




Table 2. Background Information of Interviewees 
 Title 





Management Center director 23 13 2 
 Senior technical manager 12 4 3 
 
Sectional head of  
mechanical engineering 
7 7 1 
Case Alpha Project manager 11 10 1 
 SMT engineer 12 3 1 
 Mechanical engineer 7 6 1 
 Product engineer 11 4.5 1 
 Designer 3 2 1 
Case Beta Project manager 11 10 1 
 SMT engineer 11 5 1 
 Mechanical engineer 4 4 2 
 Product engineer 11 2 1 
 Industrial engineer 12 4 1 
Total    17 
3.3 Data Analysis  
Informed by our preliminary analytical model, each 
case was split into episodes of interaction that were 
triggered by a major project event (e.g., release of a 
prototype) and ended with changes in the control 
context (e.g., MRR as a reference point for two-way 
communication). Each episode had a certain continuity 
in the activities, separated by discontinuities in the 
behavioral patterns associated with the dissemination 
and adoption of the MRR in the project (Langley, 
1999). For example, in one episode, the controller 
lifted communication barriers and crafted channels for 
communication (e.g., meetings) to improve project 
transparency; controlees then could use the MRR to 
collect information for product analysis. This 
facilitated the construction of controlees’ capacity for 
self-monitoring and became the point of departure for 
another episode. By examining successive episodes of 
social interaction, we could understand how 
(inter)action in one episode led to changes in the 
context that affected action in subsequent episodes. 
Three episodes of social interaction surrounding the 
focal control (i.e., the MRR) were compared across the 
two cases. 
The analysis proceeded in three stages, following the 
logic of constant comparison (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Huberman & Miles, 1998; Yin, 2003). In the first stage, 
we analyzed documents and interviews to uncover the 
MRR’s main technical areas and the sequences for the 
enactment of those areas in each case. By the end of 
the first stage, we had an understanding of the 
chronological flow of events and could identify three 
key episodes for each case. In the second stage, we 
coded and mapped pieces of evidence to elements of 
our preliminary model to draw a rich picture of social 
interaction within each case. A draft codebook was 
created after the two authors read and discussed 
separate case profiles and mapped a set of quotes to 
concepts in our preliminary model (i.e., deductive 
coding) (Crabtree & Miller, 1999). The first author 
coded the data, while the second author played devil’s 
advocate. Discrepancies were discussed and the 
codebook was modified to achieve agreement. 
Episodes of social interaction were examined to 
analyze how and why one episode led to another. New 
concepts were allowed to emerge and were categorized 
(i.e., inductive coding). These new codes captured the 
patterns and reasons for controller/controlee 
(inter)action, enactment outcomes of individual 
episodes, and project outcomes. Together, the coding 
uncovered (1) what the controller and controlee did in 
association with the MRR; (2) why they behaved in a 
particular way; and (3) what consequences the enacted 
MRR had. Sample categories/concepts coded and 
developed are shown in Table 3. 
The Reinforcing Effects of Formal Control Enactment  
 
321 
Table 3. Representative Quotes Grouped According to Code Categories 
Category Concept Definition Quote 
Context Other controls 
(formal) 
A mechanism specifying desired 
outcomes/behaviors as a policy or 
rule for the engineers to engage in 
with explicit contingent 
rewards/punishments ensuing 
… had to meet our departmental KPIs [key performance 
indicators], like overall productivity, MOH 






A mechanism instituted by a group 
of individuals and relying on 
shared norms, values, or beliefs to 
regulate behaviors 
[Team members] could check each other’s schedule, 
knowing who had been careless filling in the doc or who 
had lagged behind … a source of pressure … forced them 
to close issues … or the team would be in trouble (senior 
technical manager, Project Alpha) 
Noncontrol 
factors  
Contextual factors influencing the 
controller’s or controlee’s choices 
of action 
… I felt like I had no power to make any decision.… The 
R&D [designers] meddled in things. We only made 
decisions on minor issues. For important issues they 
would step in and make decisions for us (mechanical 
engineer, Project Beta). 
Control 
enactment  
Enabling style Controllers disseminate 
information about the MRR and 
control activities and allow 
controlees to adapt the MRR 
I was not more knowledgeable than the mechanical or 
product engineers.… They told me what to add to the 
checklist and then I did it accordingly … new version is 




Controllers hide information about 
the MRR and control activities and 
disallow controlees to deviate from 
the MRR 
I queried each engineer [about their progress] and 
checked off items…. I didn’t send the doc to the engineers 
… unless something serious happened. Then I would 
highlight the MRR item and send [the checklist] to the 
PIC [person in charge]…. I would send the doc to his 







Controlees receive goals/means/ 
rewards/punishments from others 
and take no ownership 
… We’re only there to support them [the project manager 
and the designers]…. It’s the PM who had to face the 
time-to-market pressure… (industrial engineer, Project 
Beta) 
Self-goals Controlees have a high degree of 
influence in determining goals for 
themselves or set goals higher than 
those set by others 
[Finding design bugs] is an important part of our 
work…. [One bug] persisted … we judged it to be a 
design issue. They [designers] first were not persuaded 
and argued that this couldn’t be the cause. We kept 





Controlees gather cues about their 
behaviors/performance, track 
deviations and strive to come up 
with solutions 
I suggested the addition of two or three items to the 
[MRR] checklist [for the controller’s approval]. For the 
past few months, I’d encountered several problems with 
packaging and labeling, like the label stuck out from the 
surface or did not stick ... they were minor issues, which 




Controlees demonstrate a high 
level of autonomy or identify 
design auditing as congruent with 
personal needs 
We started the manufacturability checks at the lab pilot 
run phase. If we could, we would have done it much 
earlier… it’s exactly what we had to do. I don’t think it 
increased our workload. (product engineer, Project 
Alpha) 









Formal control enacted 
enhances/depletes controlees’ 
capacity/motivation for self-control 
… [With the MRR] now the project manager, layout 
[engineers], R&D [designers] could simply use the 
checklists on their own. (SMT engineer, Project Alpha) 
Compensation/ 
reinforcement 
Weaknesses of formal control are 
compensated for/reinforced 
There’s no way I could get the checks properly done [due 
to situational constraints]…. [The product engineer] kept 
asking for the data to fill in the MRR. In the end, I made 
a guess…. The guess could be very wrong. (industrial 





A combination of deadlines, 
product functionality or service 
quality in deliveries 
… two weeks ahead of the scheduled delivery date … 
impressed by our quick response and service quality … 




Nonfinancial aspects of projects 
that (fail to) meet controlees’ 
psychological needs (e.g., the 
ability to exercise influence, 
recognition) 
We didn’t have the power to block the product … very 
frustrated … whenever there’s a problem, the project 
manager always got very nervous and questioned our 
solution… (SMT engineer, Project Beta) 
In the third stage, we moved from episode-level, to 
case-level analysis and comparative case analysis. A 
model was inductively constructed for each case, 
explaining linkages between control enactment and 
controlee response in the context of the three episodes. 
These two models were then compared to allow us to 
arrive at our final process model. 
4 Findings 
The MRR was implemented and available for use in 
early January 2009. By the beginning of data collection, 
engineers had already signed up for and attended one 
of two MRR training sessions at the Center. During the 
training, the engineers were introduced to the major 
technical areas of the MRR. Members from both 
projects thus heard about what the MRR was and the 
information it contained. However, when and how to 
apply the MRR along with other controls was the 
purview of a senior technical manager in Project Alpha 
and a product engineer in Project Beta. 
An examination of the social interaction surrounding 
the MRR for the two projects revealed the same three 
episodes, coinciding with three product development 
phases at MassCo. These were the: (1) lab pilot run, (2) 
engineering pilot run, and (3) pilot production run. 
During the lab pilot run (Episode 1), designers were 
charged with producing prototypes, occasionally with 
engineers’ input about product design. The lab pilot 
run was critical for engineers to learn about the new 
product and to identify design errors from the 
production perspective. In relation to this episode, we 
discuss how the controllers in the two projects 
distributed distinct messages about and enacted the 
MRR in ways that would develop (or not) engineers’ 
capacity to handle their new responsibilities (i.e., 
“constructing capacity” vs. “constructing constraints”). 
During the engineering pilot run (Episode 2), engineers 
produced a small number of products to ensure the new 
design was producible within a particular 
manufacturing environment. Production problems 
were explicitly considered as part of product design. 
The two groups applied the MRR differently to debug 
the product and production process—engineers in 
Project Alpha adapted the MRR to their tasks and 
communicated interactively with designers 
(“negotiating discretion”), whereas in Project Beta, the 
MRR was principally used to coerce engineers into 
performing tasks they felt were not in their purview 
(“negotiating dependence”). 
During the pilot production run (Episode 3), a 
relatively large number of products were produced 
using the mass production process. This run was 
designed to identify issues that would arise during 
mass production. Deliverables to controllers became 
more serious because any problem would increase 
production costs, resulting in a poor project outcome. 
In this episode, engineers used the MRR to resolve 
pending problems and detail future solutions for 
unresolved problems in Project Alpha (“toward 
problem solving”). In Project Beta, the resolution of 
many problems was delayed, and engineers used the 
MRR to cover problems and avoid blame (“toward 
self-protection”). 
Overall, we noticed a decisive difference in the way the 
MRR was used within the two projects right from the 
beginning. Understandably, the final enactment 
outcomes differed. 




Figure 3. How Formal Control was Enacted to Facilitate Self-Control in Project Alpha 
 
4.1 Project Alpha 
Project Alpha was commissioned by a Fortune 500 
company. This was the first time MassCo became part 
of this client’s supply chain. However, the project 
schedule was extremely tight. The client’s 
international purchase officer in Taiwan even 
considered on-time completion to be “impossible.” 
When the project started, a senior technical manager 
from the Center, Clark (the controller), solicited 
project information from the project manager. He 
realized engineers had been given about four weeks to 
complete pilot production and volunteered to help 
implement the MRR in Project Alpha. Clark was 
originally trained as an SMT engineer, was known for 
his emphasis on punctuality, and was nicknamed 
“Clock.” He was an architect of the MRR, and “[had] 
good knowledge of its spirit” (Center director) and the 
authority to settle disputes over the MRR. Figure 3 
provides an overview of how self-control was enabled 
in Project Alpha over the three episodes. The figure 
will be elaborated on in the following results 
description, with italicized headers of individual 
paragraphs corresponding to enactment outcomes in 
each episode (i.e., yellow arrows in Figure 3). 
Episode 1: Constructing Capacity. Early in the lab 
pilot run phase, Clark wanted to provide Project Alpha 
with a high degree of formalization. He felt the MRR 
implementation would facilitate the swift delivery of 
the overall pilot production outcome. However, there 
were situational contingency-formal control gaps 
between the formal control (i.e., the MRR) and the 
project situation, including engineers’ confusion about 
the MRR and contextual constraints that made it 
difficult for engineers to follow the MRR. He thus 
made clear his expectations of the MRR to the 
engineers. Clark also coordinated with the project 
manager and Center director to remove obstacles to the 
MRR’s implementation.  
MRR as a reference point for two-way 
communication in the team. Clark held a briefing to 
explain the MRR context and emphasized how its 
implementation would help identify and solve 
problems, especially those concerning product design. 
He also placed the MRR checklist on a shared server 
accessible to the engineers, the project manager, and 
the designers. 
Engineers thus understood they had the additional role 
of a product design auditor and “the MRR was 
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problematic yield rates]” (SMT engineer, Project 
Alpha). Engineers were encouraged to get involved in 
product analysis activities as early as they could and to 
raise issues with the MRR. 
The engineers discussed with Clark obstacles that 
could impede the MRR implementation. Two major 
obstacles at that time were (1) designers’ domination 
over engineers, and (2) other projects that competed 
for resources available to engineers (e.g., limited 
factory facilities or having to pay attention to multiple 
ongoing projects). At MassCo, designers rarely sought 
engineers’ opinions, and tended not to share project 
information without being asked. Clark thus solicited 
support from the project manager for the MRR 
implementation. He invited the project manager to the 
first meeting with engineers. As a result, the project 
manager understood that the MRR could “provide a 
platform for discussion” between engineers and 
designers. After the meeting, the project manager 
explained the MRR to designers and demanded they 
respond to issues raised by engineers. Two-way 
communication between engineers and designers was 
thus established, thereby enhancing transparency to 
help engineers clarify controller goals and their new 
role (Figure 3, Arrow ①). 
MRR became a tool for early design auditing. With 
the consent of the Center director, Clark also helped 
negate noncontrol factors that could constrain 
engineers’ performance of their new 
roles/responsibilities. For example, he set aside other 
big projects for them and rescheduled several smaller 
ones to ensure that the facilities they required were 
made available. 
Engineers felt that they were well supported and could 
use the MRR to access product information for design 
auditing. For example, engineers could use the MRR 
to demand the early release of information from 
designers to discover design flaws soon after 
introduction. The information included engineering 
drawings, designers’ design bug reviews, and 
functionality test plans (e.g., versions of software and 
parameter configurations). They were sometimes 
hyperlinked to MRR items to support engineers’ 
judgment about the design. Engineers could also 
provide results of their analyses to designers as early 
as “the lab pilot run phase” (product engineer). Once 
engineers and designers agreed on the design, 
engineers could commit themselves to improving 
production (Figure 3, Arrow ②). That is, impediment 
removal further enhanced transparency to allow 
engineers’ self-monitoring. 
Episode 2: Negotiating Discretion. When the 
engineering pilot run started, engineers already 
understood the MRR’s history and rationale (and its 
embedded goals). They executed the MRR and 
checked off items accordingly. When disputes and 
problems with the MRR arose (e.g., relevancy or 
ownership of MRR checklist items), they were fully 
discussed to further clarify controller goals (i.e., 
product auditing). 
MRR adapted and aligned with situations. Clark 
allowed engineers to individually reinterpret and adapt 
MRR items to the situation (e.g., reassigned 
ownership). For example, engineers could classify 
some items as “must-do” or “recommend-to-do” (SMT 
engineer) and were able to perform checks as they 
considered appropriate. Furthermore, engineers were 
able to suggest additional items or critical elements 
that had not been considered in the MRR based on their 
prior experience. Clark used those suggestions to 
improve the MRR. 
I suggested the addition of two or three 
items to the [MRR] checklist [for the 
controller’s approval]. Over the past few 
months, I’d encountered several problems 
with packaging and labeling, like labels 
that stuck out from the surface or did not 
stick ... they were minor issues, which could 
easily escape our notice. With them being 
included, we could prevent them 
(mechanical engineer, Project Alpha). 
Engineers successfully “revealed many design 
problems” (senior technical manager, Project Alpha) 
and recorded them in the MRR for further designer 
audits. For example, the MRR encouraged engineers to 
examine the alignment of holes in the mechanical 
assembly from different perspectives, including 
manufacturing efficiency, ease of maintenance, and 
client use. Three major potential defects were 
discovered. Engineers informed designers about these 
defects and inquired about design changes. Designers 
explained that one of them was unchangeable due to 
the client’s insistence on this design feature and 
demanded more evidence of the other two defects. 
Engineers kept monitoring the defects, finding 
approximately 40 production problems but resolving 
many of them. 
Because of engineers’ individual interpretation of the 
MRR and its ensuing modification (i.e., repair enacted), 
they accepted product auditing as their responsibility 
and readily embraced the adapted MRR to master their 
tasks (i.e., self-goals setting) (Figure 3, Arrow ②). Their 
acceptance of this additional responsibility was due to 
the utility of the MRR in helping them perform their 
tasks (i.e., review and monitor design defects), rather 
than their intrinsic desire to do so. 
Episode 3: Toward Problem Solving. Subsequently, 
the focus moved to addressing the problems identified 
to meet relevant control requirements. Over the years, 
the engineers at Project Alpha developed a routine to 
deal with and report engineering problems within one 
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week. Publicity associated with the checklist put 
engineers under each other’s scrutiny and made them 
aware that lateness could have a snowball effect 
impacting the overall project. The senior technical 
manager also emphasized punctuality. As a result, 
punctuality became a buzzword to allow the project 
team to “have enough time to evaluate the 
manufacturability of product design, prepare 
components, and take action” (SMT engineer, Project 
Alpha). 
A safe space for new behaviors. Clark left the 
engineers to perform their tasks. While the project was 
under a tight schedule, because the MRR was new, 
Clark relaxed many formal controls (i.e., tolerance for 
interim deviations, loose relationships between 
rewards/punishments, and performance) to 
accommodate necessary changes to current behavioral 
patterns. Engineers selectively responded to controls 
and adapted behaviors appropriate to emergent 
situations. The only time Clark intervened was when 
they lagged behind the agreed schedule or did not fill in 
the MRR properly. Even when Clark intervened, he did 
so through friendly emails or corridor talks rather than 
through formal disciplinary processes. Because some 
controls were relaxed (i.e., repair), a space emerged for 
engineers to adapt behaviors appropriate for emergent 
situations without fear of being punished (Figure 3, 
Arrow ④). “We did what we needed to do … Clark only 
occasionally intervened. Like when I missed some 
details or forgot to check off some items, Clark would 
send a reminder or chatted with me about it (product 
engineer, Project Alpha). 
A collaborative culture to buttress the pursuit of self-
goals. Norms and routines conducive to collaboration 
started to emerge (e.g., punctuality, respect for 
professional expertise). Due to the repeated enactment 
of transparency and repair, individual engineers 
understood that being late would create a snowball 
effect that would impact the project’s schedule and the 
relationship between their tasks and others’ tasks. 
Consequently, they contributed their expertise in a 
cooperative way. Collaboration buttressed the 
individual’s setting and the pursuit of challenging self-
goals. Since information was available and potential 
threats (e.g., schedule delay) could be spotted early, 
engineers were better able to plan actions: “…like the 
mechanical engineer needed extra time for getting a 
fixture. I had to get [a tool] and I estimated that it would 
take us a month to get it … issues were flagged in 
advance. If there’s any difficulty, we negotiated. 
(product engineer, Project Alpha) 
Also, the checklist, compiled from the Center’s best 
practices, was applied as an overarching control to 
reduce control conflicts. The checklist reduced mistakes 
and reworking, saving engineers’ energy and mental 
capacity. 
Although most tasks were allocated a week for 
completion, engineers were intrinsically motivated to 
use their excess capacity to impose a more challenging 
time limit of “3 days” for addressing minor engineering 
problems (SMT engineer). This gave them more time 
and energy to “focus on addressing [real] problems” 
(product engineer, Project Alpha). 
To request a change in the design, engineers first had to 
prove there was a design defect (faulty software or/and 
hardware design), which caused a product malfunction 
or manufacturing inefficiencies. To find one defect 
related to errors in the region code, engineers repeatedly 
tested the product in different ways. As a result of the 
repeated testing, designers acknowledged that this was a 
design defect (and not a defect of the testing process). 
Although designers failed to come up with a solution, 
both designers and engineers agreed that it was an “open 
issue, to-be-solved in the next [product] version” 
(product engineer). 
Another defect was related to the design of a shielding 
cover. Engineers indicated that the one-piece design 
increased the risk to components when they had to 
remove the cover for inspection or maintenance 
purposes. Engineers provided evidence, showing that 
“one piece [out of five] was damaged during pilot 
production” (SMT engineer, Project Alpha). Engineers 
voluntarily came up with a two-piece design with a 
removable cover and helped source suppliers for the 
new component. Designers thus had a healthy respect 
for engineers and considered them “real experts” with 
whom the designers would willingly work (designer, 
Project Alpha). Overall, because collaboration was 
continually facilitated, a collaborative culture emerged, 
with engineers across the team being able to set 
challenging self-goals and competently pursue these 
goals (Figure 3, Arrow ⑤). 
Project outcome. The outcome of Project Alpha was 
positive. First, the project was completed two weeks 
earlier than planned. The client was impressed by the 
team’s detailed interim reports and product quality. 
Second, engineers felt empowered to identify and 
resolve problems. They voluntarily uncovered and 
identified the causes of some problems early and helped 
to solve these problems with designers. The project 
manager and designers thus attributed project success 
partially to engineers’ “timely identification of design 
defects” (project manager, Project Alpha). 
4.2 Project Beta 
Project Beta was commissioned by a Fortune 500 
company that was a repeat customer. The project 
involved the design and manufacture of a mature 
product that used an old technology. A junior product 
engineer was charged with overseeing its pilot 
production and was informed that they had seven weeks 
to complete the task. 





Figure 4. How Formal Control was Enacted to Impede Self-Control in Project Beta 
Episode 1: Constructing Constraints. Like Project 
Alpha, there was a gap between what the MRR 
mandated and the actual work required on the project. 
However, during the lab pilot run, the junior product 
engineer took no action to clarify or circulate 
information about the MRR for engineers and other 
project members. 
MRR reinforced control/constraints on controlees. 
The junior product engineer considered the MRR as 
another administrative hassle engineers had to face. He 
thus enacted the MRR as just one of many controls to 
regulate engineers, which allowed him to “[keep] an 
eye” on individual engineers and to record their 
progress. Designer domination was also obvious in 
Project Beta, with designers hoarding project 
information and engineers acting as passive 
information receivers. 
The junior product engineer was informed about the 
project before engineers. Designers invited him to see 
a prototype. However, the junior product engineer did 
not update other engineers on the project status, nor did 
he make clear when and how the MRR would be 
applied. He kept the MRR to himself and assumed 
most associated administrative functions, including 
checking off items on engineers’ behalf. Engineers 
became quite confused about “where the MRR stood” 
and “how it should be implemented” (mechanical 
engineer, Project Beta). They waited for instructions 
about the MRR implementation. 
The project manager was also kept in the dark about 
the MRR and did not see the MRR as a project 
management tool. Instead, she viewed the MRR as a 
way for the Center to exert control on engineers. She 
used a separate checklist to assess product design. In 
Project Beta, designers were their own auditors, and 
engineers were not allowed to give input. Designers 
did not even hear about the MRR. This cut the 
engineers off from product analysis activities (Figure 
4, Arrow ① ). Overall, because the junior product 
engineer did not remove impediments (i.e., confusion, 
designer domination), transparency was inhibited, 
leading to engineers’ misunderstanding of controller 
goals and the MRR. 
Episode 2: Negotiating Dependence. When the 
engineering pilot run started, engineers only received 
project information from designers about routine 
production checks. 
MRR did not create behavioral change. The junior 
product engineer queried engineers about their 
progress and checked off items in private, without 
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knowledge about the MRR, engineers could not use the 
MRR to give timely input about the product. They fell 
back on their usual routine checks and took no 
responsibilities for product auditing. Many items in the 
MRR were left with remarks, such as “under review” 
or “to be done by [a date]” (product engineer).  
The junior product engineer segregated the MRR 
according to different functions and informed 
engineers of isolated tasks they were responsible for. 
Engineers had few opportunities to physically access 
the MRR. Engineers did not know how their behaviors 
impacted others or the overall project. Due to a lack of 
transparency, they performed the same behaviors on 
this project that they normally performed on other 
similar projects. Thus, at this stage, the MRR did not 
result in a change in engineer behavior (Figure 4, 
Arrow ②). 
MRR remained misaligned with situations. The 
only time an engineer saw the checklist was when the 
junior product engineer noticed that “something 
serious happened” (junior product engineer, Project 
Beta) and felt the engineer in question was responsible 
for the problematic item. At that point, the engineer 
received a copy of a part of the checklist with 
problematic items highlighted. The junior product 
engineer would also carbon copy the engineer’s direct 
supervisor to ensure compliance. 
When conflicts over responsibilities for MRR items 
occurred or the relevance of MRR items to the product 
was raised, the junior product engineer was the one 
who determined who was responsible for the 
problematic item or whether an item was relevant. 
This led to disagreements and perfunctory 
performance for some items. Engineers would perform 
checks to uncover problems and come up with 
temporary solutions. Due to a lack of repair, there 
remained a gap between the MRR and the situations 
engineers faced (Figure 4, Arrow ③). 
I didn’t think [one task] was my 
responsibility. It should have been under 
the purview of the product engineer… we 
should have discussed about this, but we 
didn’t. Up to today, I still disagree that it 
should be my responsibility (SMT engineer). 
Episode 3: Toward Self-Protection. At the onset of 
the pilot production run, five potential design errors 
and a dozen production issues were identified, based 
on limited information from designers. In this episode, 
a decisive change in engineers’ behavior occurred. 
Instead of applying the MRR to root out issues, the 
engineers applied it to absolve themselves of 
responsibility for problems. 
MRR depleted controlees’ resources. First, 
engineers sought the permission of the junior product 
engineer to reschedule solutions for several production 
issues. They all agreed to ensure that issues were 
resolved by the last week of pilot production. To 
ensure compliance, the junior product engineer 
strengthened his control through frequent reviews of 
engineers. In the last week of pilot production, he 
queried engineers about their progress every day. As 
controls and constraints increased, engineers began to 
feel overstretched. 
I had many on-going projects and each of 
them also had to meet our departmental 
KPIs [key performance indicators], like 
overall productivity, MOH [manufacturing 
overheads] … we’re asked to help each 
other out, but really had no energy left. 
We’re totally overstretched. (industrial 
engineer, Project Beta) 
The junior product engineer required that many checks 
in the MRR be performed exactly as specified, 
regardless of the on-the-ground relationship between 
those tasks and project achievement. For example, the 
MRR mandated engineers to perform two checks: one 
a week before, and the other a day before each pilot 
production run. The junior product engineer would 
then check on the exact time the task was performed 
and the process taken. These checks required that 
resources that were not forthcoming be made available 
to engineers. For example, the assembly lines the 
engineers were supposed to use were often booked by 
others. 
To overcome these constraints and to satisfy the 
immediate demands made by the junior product 
engineer, engineers would perform perfunctory checks 
or even “make a guess” (industrial engineer, Project 
Beta). Engineers devoted energy to address issues in 
the MRR instead of addressing concerns in production 
itself (Figure 4, Arrow ④). The mechanical application 
of the MRR (no repair) led to controlees’ depletion of 
capacity.  
A self-protective culture emerged. Second, designers 
rejected engineers’ requests for design changes 
without any explanation. This showed designers’ lack 
of respect toward the engineers. Because of designers’ 
mistrust of engineers, they discounted engineers’ 
opinions, even responding to engineers with sarcasm. 
[In a meeting] our people told [a designer] 
that the 0.5mm distance between two pads 
was far too small. It would be better if it were 
over 0.8. The designer then replied derisively, 
saying that it’s the global trend to produce 
smaller and more sophisticated gadgets 
(mechanical engineer, Project Beta). 
Engineers “could only suggest changes to the designer” 
(mechanical engineer, Project Beta), but received a 
disproportionate amount of blame when things went 




wrong. Therefore, engineers used the MRR as a 
document to avoid blame and disclaim responsibility 
during an audit (i.e., unintended by the controller). For 
example, after his request for a design change was 
refused, an engineer asked the junior product engineer 
to put a remark reading “design couldn’t be changed” 
and “[designer’s name] as the PIC [person in charge]” 
(SMT engineer, Project Beta) in the checklist. Overall, 
disproportionate punishment led to controlees’ 
enacting self-protective behaviors (Figure 4, Arrow ⑤). 
Project outcome. The outcome of Project Beta was 
not so positive. First, Project Beta was completed with 
a pilot production yield rate of 88.54% and several 
design errors were unaddressed. Although the rate 
surpassed the requested threshold (85%), engineers 
were not satisfied because this was a mature product. 
Second, mechanical execution of the MRR reinforced 
engineers’ sense of subjugation. They were closely 
monitored by the product engineer, given “no power to 
block the [problematic] product” (SMT engineer, 
Project Beta), and blamed for problems about which 
they “could do nothing” (mechanical engineer, Project 
Beta). Engineers felt unfairly exploited. The Appendix 
summarizes the temporal sequence of 
controller/controlee (inter)action in each project. 
5 Discussion and Implications 
This study aims to advance our understanding of 
control enactment in the complex IT project context. 
To achieve this, we studied the emerging process 
surrounding an enacted formal control and, 
specifically, how the enactment process could lead to 
controlee self-control. Our findings suggest the 
importance of the enactment of both transparency and 
repair for controlees’ understanding of controller goals 
and the building of a trusting/collaborative culture (i.e., 
clan control). In Episode 1 of Project Alpha, because 
of the repeated enactment of transparency (e.g., two-
way communication), engineers understood controller 
goals and means to deliver results (i.e., via early 
involvement in product analysis). However, 
expectations were formally conveyed or relayed (e.g., 
to designers) in formal meetings or in the name of the 
controller and/or project manager. The engineers thus 
had no personal attachment to assigned tasks. In 
Episode 2, because the controller repeatedly allowed 
for repair (e.g., controller’s relaxing of other controls), 
engineers could derive personal goals and meaning 
from their tasks. Further, given the complexity of some 
issues (e.g., complex design errors), they could not 
perform effectively without others contributing their 
energy, ideas or time toward reaching or exceeding 
controller goals. Therefore, it was not until Episode 3 
when both transparency and repair became rooted in 
the control context and collaborative norms were 
reinforced (e.g., information sharing) that engineers 
felt genuinely confident about directing their own 
activities (e.g., expediting routine checks) to work 
toward their self-goals and controller goals. In contrast, 
transparency and repair were inhibited from the outset 
of Project Beta. Repeated misunderstanding and 
mistrust led engineers to engage in self-protective 
behaviors. 
5.1 The Role of Transparency and Repair 
in Reinforcing Cycles  
Figure 5 integrates theory and our empirical results to 
demonstrate how controllers can enact the same formal 
control, but because they employ distinct control styles, 
they create divergent controlee responses and 
reinforcing cycles. In a complex project situation, it is 
impossible for the controller to anticipate all possible 
circumstances and design formal controls accordingly. 
New controls introduced to change controlees’ 
behaviors thus must be amended as situations emerge 
(“situational contingency-formal control gap”). Within 
a project, there are some tasks where controlees know 
the appropriate behaviors for completing their tasks, 
exact outcomes to be achieved, or exact means-ends 
connections (clear tasks), and some tasks where 
controlees do not know the appropriate behaviors, 
outcomes to be achieved, or means-ends connections 
(uncertain tasks) (March & Simon, 1958). Clear tasks 
provide opportunities for controlees to perform 
appropriate behaviors for that specific project situation 
and to infer and validate their understanding of 
controller goals.  
The combination of clear tasks, empowerment, and the 
controller providing feedback on task performance 
allowed controlees to correctly interpret project 
situations and understand controller goals. For 
example, in Project Alpha, engineers were told to use 
the MRR to audit product design and knew that 
effective auditing required early participation in 
product analysis. Because they could adapt the MRR 
according to controller feedback to complete their 
tasks, they were able to understand and confirm these 
goals. In contrast, when tasks are unclear, and the 
controller hoards information and does not provide 
feedback, controlees become confused and avoid 
responsibility (to avoid punishment). Distinct styles of 
control enactment by the controller thus trigger 
separate reinforcing cycles. 
In our theorization, we identified two principal 
elements in formal control enactment, namely 
transparency and repair. It is the repeated enactment of 
the two elements by the controller that enables the 
development of controlees’ capacity and motivation to 
exercise self-control in response to emerging situations.  




Figure 5. Reinforcing Cycles of Formal Control Enactment in Complex IT Projects 
Creating transparency involves the controller’s crafting 
of two-way communication channels (and lifting 
constraints on those channels) to clarify 
goals/requirements and to solicit continuous feedback. 
Thus, controllers who are open with controlees can send 
clear signals about their motives and create an implicit 
promise that controlees’ feedback and opinions will be 
appreciated. Because controlees repeatedly witness the 
communication and action based on such implicit 
promises (e.g., controllers ask for and follow up on 
controlees’ feedback), they can make correct inferences 
about the controller’s expectations and feel they can 
come forward with any issue (Vogelgesang, Leroy, & 
Avolio, 2013). For example, in Episode 1 of Project 
Alpha, Clark spent time explaining to engineers the 
objective of the MRR and discussed the means to deliver 
those objectives (e.g., early involvement in product 
analysis). He explicitly told them he wanted feedback 
about improving the manufacturing process. This gave 
engineers the opportunity to involve themselves in 




design decisions. Clark thus understood the constraints 
faced by engineers and helped alleviate them. Because 
of the communication, the engineers could determine 
which behaviors would help achieve controller goals 
and then chose to perform them, monitoring their own 
progress. In contrast, inhibiting transparency involves 
the controller hoarding information from controlees. 
The controlees thus cannot make correct inferences 
about controller goals and may thus distrust the 
controller. 
In some cases, formal controls can malfunction, causing 
inappropriate behavior to arise, especially if a changing 
situation requires changed behavior. If controlees 
perceive they are likely to be punished for emergent, 
innovative behaviors appropriate to changing 
circumstances, it is unlikely they will perform such 
behaviors. Thus, controllers must create a safe space for 
controlees to try new behaviors. Allowing for repair 
involves relaxing formal control to allow controlees to 
take the initiative to try behaviors they otherwise would 
not. In contrast, inhibiting repair involves the use of 
punishment to strengthen control on controlees. Repair 
allows for two kinds of controlee behaviors. First, it 
allows for behaviors that formal control might 
unintentionally suppress. For example, one initial 
formal control exerted was assigning certain tasks to 
individual controlees. However, complex problems 
could have multiple causes (e.g., hardware 
incompatibility, software bugs) and the individual 
formally assigned to a role may not be appropriate for it. 
Hence, the more appropriate behavior is for controlees 
to take collective ownership. In Project Alpha, one 
MRR item was assigned to an engineer to check a design 
feature. The engineer explained to the controller that this 
would actually impede dynamic problem diagnosis. 
Several engineers thus jointly examined the design 
feature from their respective perspectives. 
Second, repair allows emergent behaviors to develop to 
address unanticipated issues. Research has 
demonstrated that professionals often genuinely want 
things to work and to make a difference (Alvesson & 
Kärreman, 2007). If given the space, they will enact 
behaviors concordant with a desire to be responsible. In 
Episode 3 of Project Alpha, for example, because of the 
way control was enacted in prior episodes, engineers 
understood their new responsibility (i.e., product 
auditing) in relation to others and the overall project. 
They thus began to take on a broader range of activities 
beyond those initially prescribed by the MRR (i.e., 
testing product design, reporting design issues). These 
included challenging the existing design, proposing 
joint solutions of design issues, and monitoring project 
progress, something they had never done previously. 
We next detail separate reinforcing cycles triggered by 
distinct control styles and controlee responses as 
illustrated in Figure 5. 
In Episode 1 of Project Alpha, because of transparency, 
controlees began to use the MRR to acquire product 
information from designers and to seek designer 
feedback; and in Episode 2, because of repair and the 
continuous creation of transparency, the controlees 
could suggest informed changes to the MRR, and 
selectively test the relevant design features specified in 
the MRR without the fear of being punished. As a result, 
controlees come to know controller goals and the 
means-ends relationships, constructing their capacity to 
handle their responsibilities. They also know they can 
adapt control, i.e., to negotiate discretion to complete 
their tasks. 
As controlees witness greater transparency and then 
repair, they internalize controller goals (i.e., transform 
controller goals into their own), experience decreased 
vulnerability, and become confident in their own 
judgments. A positive reinforcing cycle is created. In 
Episode 3 of Project Alpha, the controller further 
relaxed controls to accommodate new behaviors for 
uncertain tasks. This leads to the creation of a safe 
space for controlees to judiciously apply their personal 
resources to improvise or experiment with new 
behaviors that are potentially beneficial to the project 
(e.g., collaborating behaviors). Furthermore, the 
coordination of collective efforts is required because of 
the inherent uncertainty of complex projects. In 
Episode 3 of Project Alpha, the controller facilitated 
collaboration by emphasizing information sharing and 
respect for expertise. A collaborative culture (i.e., clan 
control) emerged to support controlees to contribute 
their expertise in a cooperative manner. The engineers 
thus could improvise for joint problem solving and the 
pursuit of challenging goals beyond the MRR 
requirements (i.e., self-goal setting). In sum, 
transparency and repair together foster controlees’ 
creative behaviors toward problem solving to benefit 
both the controller and controlee (i.e., self-controlling). 
For example, in addition to reporting design errors, 
engineers also proposed a new design and helped 
source new components to lower production risks. This 
improved not only product design but also production 
performance, leading to high performance. 
Negative reinforcing cycles. Project Beta illustrates 
what happens when formal control is enacted without 
transparency and repair. Without transparency, 
controlees are unsure of controller goals and what 
appropriate behaviors would be. The most likely 
response in this situation (as observed in Project Beta) 
is for controlees to perform behaviors in alignment 
with the status quo (i.e., lacking behavioral change), 
with formal control becoming constraints on 
controlees. Thus, engineers in Episode 1 of Project 
Beta remained passive and allowed designers to run the 
project. Of course, this need not be the only possible 
controlee response. However, in complex IT projects, 
the likelihood of a controlee who does not understand 
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controller goals responding in a way consistent with 
controller goals is low. 
When new controls are introduced, there is a general 
expectation that controlees’ behaviors will change. 
When controlees are not performing new behaviors 
anticipated by an authoritative-style controller, the 
controller enacts punishment (i.e., inhibiting repair). 
In Episode 2 of Project Beta, the controller demanded 
engineers execute pre-specified checks under all 
circumstances and threatened to punish them for 
deviance. Without repair, controlees are unwilling to 
risk adaptive behaviors and are not able to learn which 
behaviors are effective for delivering desired results. 
Because controlees do not understand controller goals 
and distrust the controller, they feel that they are forced 
to comply with formal control. They develop 
dependence on the controller and perform tasks as they 
are told to. Because those tasks are expectable, 
controlees are still able to attain acceptable 
performance. 
However, the consistent lack of transparency and 
repair creates a negative reinforcing cycle, with a sense 
of a lack of safety and incompetence emerging. This 
exacerbates misunderstanding and distrust among the 
project team. When situations emerge, controlees 
would like to perform appropriate behaviors (at least to 
avoid punishment). However, because they do not 
know what these behaviors are (only knowing existing 
behaviors which are ineffective for delivering the 
outcome), this drains their personal resources and 
induces dysfunctional behaviors. The controller’s 
overemphasis on punishment could further induce a 
self-protective culture where controlees focus on 
minimizing loss to themselves rather than try to ensure 
the project proceeds successfully (i.e., failed clan 
control). In Episode 3 of Project Beta, an engineer 
identified some design errors and reported them to the 
designer. Because the designer refused to change the 
design, to protect himself, the engineer asked the 
controller to record the designer as responsible for 
associated production risks. The engineer then left the 
issue unresolved. Indeed, authoritative enactment can 
exacerbate conflicts in goals, and induce controlees’ 
creative behaviors for achieving outcomes not harmful 
to themselves (i.e., external controlling), eventually 
resulting in low performance. 
5.2 Relationship between Formal Control 
and Self-control 
Our study explains why enacting control in an enabling 
style facilitates self-control to close the situational 
contingency-formal control gap for the controller’s and 
controlee’s benefit, while an authoritative enactment 
prompts controlees to exploit the gap for self-
protection. Recall that self-control requires three 
elements, self-goals, self-monitoring, and intrinsic 
motivation. 
Self-goals. Our results show that an enabling 
enactment helps controlees align their self-goals with 
controller goals for two reasons. First, transparency 
allows controlees to understand controller goals. 
Enabling-style controllers apply controls to explain to 
controlees why controller goals are in place, and why 
these controls are enacted (i.e., transparency). In 
Episode 1 of Project Alpha, the enabling-style 
controller explicitly highlighted the MRR’s 
development intention (i.e., to identify design issues) 
and made it accessible to controlees. He used it to 
demonstrate how individual tasks were a part of 
controller goals (e.g., via the temporal arrangement of 
worksheets). Second, repair allows controlees to 
derive personal meaning and purpose from tasks. The 
enabling-style controller highlights to controlees when 
controls should be ignored or adapted for individual 
tasks. Controlees thus adapt controls and/or their 
behaviors and see how they contribute to controller 
goals. In Episode 2 of Project Alpha, the controller 
allowed controlees to adapt the prescribed working 
pace (i.e., one week for completing tasks). Controlees 
differentiated between routine and nonroutine 
components of their tasks and quickly completed the 
routine component to expedite the overall process. 
However, in Project Beta, the authoritative-style 
controller disallowed adaptation of controlees’ work 
arrangement and instead used the MRR as a stick to 
beat nonperforming controlees. Controlees thus 
performed tasks perfunctorily and used the MRR to 
absolve them from their responsibilities. 
Self-monitoring. Our results show that an enabling 
enactment facilitates self-monitoring for two reasons. 
First, transparency exposes controlees to project-
relevant information and performance feedback. This 
helps controlees to improve both their individual and 
collective performance. In Episode 1 of Project Alpha, 
the controller enacted the MRR to help controlees 
easily access (via a shared server) and navigate through 
diverse information (by emphasizing the temporal 
connection of tasks). Controlees thus knew they 
needed to get involved early for effective product 
auditing. Given the opportunity, controlees then chose 
to demand designers’ release of product information 
and provide their analysis to designers as early as 
possible. Second, repair allows controlees to try new 
behaviors to monitor and improve performance. In 
Project Alpha, the controller enacted the MRR to 
facilitate controlees’ independent judgments with 
input/feedback from others. Controlees could thus 
adapt or synthesize means to monitor and conduct their 
tasks (e.g., examining product features from multiple 
perspectives). In contrast, in Project Beta, because the 
controller punished new behaviors, controlees chose 
not to adapt their behaviors, but relied on the 
controller’s guidance and evaluation. 




Intrinsic motivation. Although professionals are 
initially self-motivated, they can only express this if 
they feel safe (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2007). Our 
results show that an enabling enactment improves 
controlees’ motivation to succeed for two reasons. 
First, transparency fosters trusting relationships and 
increases controlees’ perceived odds of success. 
Enabling-style controllers are open with their intent 
and make relevant information available for 
everyone’s consideration. Information thus reduces 
dependence and allows controlees to cope effectively 
with less optimal situations. In Project Alpha, the 
enabling-style controller openly shared information 
(Episode 1) and fostered norms for open 
communication and collaboration (Episode 3). 
Controlees thus felt confident in pursuing higher goals 
and making independent judgments while 
collaborating with others. Second, repair relaxes 
controls, which in turn acts to conserve controlees’ 
personal resources (e.g., cognitive/emotional resources) 
for coping with emerging problems. Personal 
resources are essential for supporting controlees’ 
feelings of competence and autonomy (i.e., intrinsic 
motivation) (Ryan & Deci, 2000a). In Episode 3 of 
Project Alpha, the controller reduced redundant 
controls and tolerated temporary deviations from the 
MRR. Controlees thus experienced limited fear of 
failure and could adapt the MRR as they considered 
appropriate (e.g., for expediting routine checks). In 
contrast, in Project Beta, the authoritative-style 
controller applied the MRR to punish deviance under 
all circumstances. This drained the controlees’ 
resources and motivation because they had to spread 
out their efforts to manage all controls and were held 
accountable for failures over which they had little 
influence. 
Together, transparency and repair foster 
trusting/collaborative relationships, and controlees’ 
understanding of (1) the connection between controller 
goals and their self-goals, and (2) means for achieving 
both goals, leading to controlees’ increased motivation 
and capacity to succeed. In contrast, the lack of 
transparency and repair introduces misunderstanding 
and mistrust, prompting controlees to embrace self-
protective behaviors. 
5.3 Contributions to Behavioral Control 
Theory 
Our research contributes to behavioral control theory 
in several important ways. First, this study explains the 
role of control enactment in facilitating self-control. 
Chua et al. (2012) argued that clan control is fostered 
in projects through the use of formal control. We 
extend that thinking by arguing that controllers can 
facilitate controlee self-control, specifically by an 
enabling enactment of formal control to promote a safe 
space for personally risky behaviors (Park, Im, & Keil, 
2008) and a collaborative culture (i.e., clan control). 
This suggests that researchers should examine control 
enactments in various styles, with the control style 
having a strong interactive effect (Keil et al., 2014; 
Wiener et al., 2016). While our study supports the 
effects of control enactment on controlee self-control 
via the promotion of clan control, we do not examine 
the interplay among the three control modes. Future 
research may examine how self-control interacts with 
formal and/or clan control (Huber et al., 2013). 
Second, this study is a response to a call by Wiener et 
al. (2016) for studying control enactment. There is 
much that we do not know about the effects of control 
enactment on people and processes in complex 
projects. Our study finds that control enactment effects 
can be reinforced by controlee response. Positive 
reinforcing effects occur when the controller 
repeatedly enacts control in an enabling manner to 
facilitate the development of controlees’ capacity and 
motivation to succeed. As a result, controlees can 
exercise self-control to respond to emergent situations 
unspecified by formal control for benefiting both the 
controller and the controlee (as observed in Project 
Alpha). Formal control and controlee self-control are 
like stone and mortar for building a wall. Once mortar 
is used to fill irregular gaps in stone, a strong wall can 
be built to withstand all elements. In contrast, negative 
reinforcing effects occur when the controller enacts 
control in an authoritative manner to reinforce 
misunderstanding and mistrust to the point where 
controlees’ motivation and capacity for achieving 
success are depleted. As a result, controlees embrace 
self-protective behaviors and exploit the situational 
contingency-formal control gap for self-protection 
only (as observed in Project Beta). This is like building 
a wall using only stone. Without mortar, wind can blow 
through the wall and the wall is not as stable. It would 
be wrong to simply conclude that enacting control in 
an enabling style is always desirable; however, just as 
you need mortar to build a high wall, we believe an 
enabling enactment is necessary for complex projects 
because controlee initiative is a prerequisite for 
success. Our study shows an enabling style allows 
controlees to more accurately sense and flexibly 
respond to emergent situations in complex projects 
(Goh, Pan, & Zuo, 2013). Given the increasing 
complexity of IT projects (e.g., IoT solutions), 
enacting control in an enabling style is likely to be 
necessary in more IT projects. 
This study also highlights that controlees play an 
essential role in the controller-controlee dynamic: one 
cannot assume that controlees will behave in a wholly 
expected way when a particular control is enacted by a 
controller. This study demonstrates that although 
controllers attempt to enact controls to ensure 
controlees’ performance, controlees are not necessarily 
driven toward behaviors beneficial to the overall 
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project. Instead, they can be driven to defensive 
behaviors, especially if their attention is narrowly 
directed toward individual task performance (Parker & 
Collins, 2010). This also supports the conjectured 
association between authoritative enactment and 
control distortion (i.e., controlees misunderstand 
controller goals and/or means to achieve said goals) 
proposed by Heumann et al. (2015) who say the 
authoritative control style could lead to higher control 
distortion because of the lack of transparency on the 
use of control. 
This study shows the importance of fostering a 
collaborative culture to support controlee self-control 
across the project team. In complex IT projects, tasks 
are often interrelated and rely on collaboration for 
completion of other tasks. Prior studies have argued for 
the importance of norms of independence and 
individualism for promoting controlee self-control 
(Choudhury & Sabherwal, 2003; Wiener et al., 2015). 
However, the coexistence of independence and a 
collaborative culture is not paradoxical, if we consider 
that independence can be facilitated by collegial peers. 
In Project Alpha, engineers could pursue challenging 
goals because of peers who released more information 
and adhered to agreed schedules to prevent bottlenecks. 
Additionally, a collaborative culture is conducive for a 
clear separation of role/responsibilities (i.e., 
independence) because expectations are articulated 
and communicated. Finally, a collaborative culture 
encourages controlees to forgo immediate, self-
interested behaviors in favor of acts based on broader 
and long-term considerations. In Project Alpha, 
engineers collaborated with designers to solve design 
errors, instead of covering up the problems or pushing 
them on to designers. A collaborative culture, in turn, 
can be fostered by controllers showing respect for 
expertise and facilitating information exchange. 
Within Project Beta, an authoritative enactment caused 
controlees to compete for resources (e.g., facilities) 
and take refuge in defensive efforts, reinforcing 
mistrust that was dysfunctional for self-control. 
Finally, our research highlights the importance of 
controlees’ capacity to work as an important 
consideration in enacting control. Individual 
controlees’ capacity to work is a limited resource 
(Baumeister et al., 1998). The execution of self-goals 
and self-monitoring requires controlees to tap into and 
consume that capacity to work (Muraven & 
Baumeister, 2000). Complex projects can quickly 
deplete the capacity to work because of task 
complexity and the need to switch mindsets in an 
evolving context (Hamilton et al., 2011). In Project 
Beta, merely complying with the demands of all 
controls overstretched the engineers. This left them 
with no energy to pursue goals beyond their narrow, 
formal responsibilities. However, in Project Alpha, 
extra support/resources and easy access to project 
information helped increase/conserve engineers’ 
capacity. When permitted to adapt to the environment, 
the engineers applied the excess capacity to align their 
self-goals with the controller goals and self-monitor 
their progress. Our case thus suggests that controlee 
self-control may be stronger when controllers enact 
control to conserve/replenish controlees’ capacity to 
work. 
5.4 Managerial Implications 
Managers have been given advice on which control to 
enact according to the characteristics of the context 
(Kirsch, 1997; Nidumolu & Subramani, 2003). 
However, we theorize that controlees play an essential 
role in control enactment, and there is often a gap 
between control and emerging situations in complex IT 
projects. Controllers need to interact with controlees in 
an enabling manner to facilitate controlee self-control 
to close this gap. Our results demonstrate that an 
enabling enactment helps enhance controlees’ capacity 
and motivation for achieving success and addressing 
emergent issues in complex projects. In return, the 
enhanced capacity and motivation increases the 
effectiveness of control enacted. The interplay 
between control enacted and controlee self-control 
contributes to superior outcomes of complex IT 
projects. 
A key question is: How does the controller start the 
positive reinforcing effect of formal control enactment 
to facilitate self-control or stop the negative 
reinforcing effect once it begins? To get the controller 
and controlee interacting to positively reinforce control 
enactment, it may be useful to create opportunities for 
interaction that go beyond command and control. For 
example, controllers can regularly discuss emerging 
situations with controlees and support individual and 
collective problem solving. This makes both 
controllers and controlees aware of the inadequacies of 
formal control and allows formal control to structure 
controlees’ work in a way that still enables the exercise 
of self-control (Molnar, Nandhakumar, & Stacey, 
2017). Moreover, while it is encouraging that the 
controller can enact transparency and repair to 
facilitate self-control, an ad hoc approach cannot be 
expected to sustain the positive reinforcing effect or 
reverse a negative one. It is the repeated controller-
controlee interaction that enables the controlee’s 
accumulation of capacity and motivation for exercising 
self-control. 
5.5 Limitations 
Several limitations of this study should be noted. First, 
this study relies on retrospective accounts of new 
product development projects. We addressed this 
limitation by using multiple interviewees and by 
collecting data within one month after the projects 
were completed. We also collected time-stamped 




control documents for triangulation of interview data. 
Second, we do not claim that self-control is the only 
way to bridge situational contingency/formal control 
gaps. Several studies have suggested that formal 
control can be complemented by other factors, such as 
boundary-spanning activities (Gopal & Gosain, 2010), 
trust (Das & Teng, 1998), or group norms and 
individual reputation (Gallivan, 2001). More research 
should be done to identify the processes through which 
formal control can be complemented to improve 
project outcomes. Third, this study is based on a 
relatively small number of cases in a specific context. 
However, while our research may not be generalizable 
to a larger population, it is likely generalizable to 
theory (i.e., the process model in Figure 5) (Lee & 
Baskerville, 2003). 
6 Conclusion 
Formal control cannot be sufficiently prespecified for 
controlling complex IT projects. Controlee self-control 
is needed to address unanticipated issues. This research 
explores the enactment of a formal control (i.e., a 
checklist) on two complex IT projects in a wireless 
manufacturing organization. We found that how a 
control is enacted is critical to understanding whether 
controlee self-control will emerge to bridge the gap 
between the initial control and emerging situations. 
The key finding is that an enabling enactment 
facilitates controlee self-control by creating a safe 
space and a trusting/collaborative culture for 
independent actions of benefit to the overall project. In 
contrast, an authoritative enactment induces 
dysfunctional behaviors among controlees who seek to 
exploit the gap for their own protection. Repeated 
controller-controlee interaction contributes to the 
reinforcing effects of control enactment on project 
outcomes. 
Finally, one could argue that controllers may adopt 
different control styles toward different controlee 
groups within a project (e.g., designer vs. engineer) 
(Soh, Chua, & Singh, 2010). This might be true. 
However, the focus is on how the control style shapes 
controlee behavior. This study suggests that controller 
behaviors predispose controlees to behave in a 
particular way. Future studies may be carried out to 
examine the interaction between the controller and 
different controlee groups. 
One could also argue that the superior outcomes of 
Project Alpha arose from differences in controller 
seniority (senior technical manager) and/or client 
relationship (new client), because the senior controller 
had more power to enact effective control and the new 
client would attract more controller attention. However, 
based on the results of this study, project outcomes are 
not necessarily associated with the actual resources 
commanded by the controller (e.g., power, time, 
workforce). In Project Beta, regardless of a relaxed 
schedule and workforce (7 weeks and 9 engineers vs. 
4 weeks and 7 engineers in Project Alpha), the 
controller chose to enact control authoritatively and 
invested energy/time blocking information flow and 
scrutinized controlees to the point that resources were 
exhausted and mistrust was reinforced, leading to 
below-par project performance. The importance of the 
structural condition is somewhat unclear. This 
suggests that additional studies in which control is 
enacted by controllers having a similar power status 
would be helpful.
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Appendix   
  
Table A1. Interaction Surrounding Control Enacted 
  Category Empirical evidence  
Project Alpha 
E1 Controller 
• transparency  
• built communication channels  
• removed impediments 
• Set up a shared server for disseminating project- and MRR 
information (with tasks’ temporal connection emphasized) 
• Discussed the MRR (goals/means/history) with engineers in 
meetings 
• Negotiated with other controllers to remove designer oppression 
and reschedule other projects  
Controlee 
• understood controller goals 
• self-monitored 
• Understood controller goals (i.e., product auditing) 
• Used the MRR to acquire product information from designers & 
started to analyze the product early 
E2 Controller 
• repair: allowed independent 
action 
• Allowed individual interpretation/adaptation of the MRR to settle 
disputes/problems 
Controlee 
• set self-goals 
• self-monitored  
• Interpreted, applied, and amended the MRR as considered 
appropriate to situational contingencies 
• Applied the MRR to identify/analyze design problems 
E3 Controller 
• repair: relaxed controls 
• facilitated collaboration 
• Relaxed other formal controls (e.g., tolerance for deviations) 
• Fostered norms to facilitate collaboration (e.g., respect for 
expertise, punctuality, information sharing) 
Controlee 
• set challenging self-goals 
• self-monitored 
• conserved personal resources 
• developed intrinsic motivation: 
perceived competence 
• Collaborated with others to pursue challenging goals 
• Monitored/solved problems unspecified by the MRR 
• Used the MRR to memorize details & expedite routine checks 
• Felt competent at design auditing 
Project Beta 
E1 Controller  
• did not remove impediments  
• hid information 
• Accepted structural constraints as given (e.g., designer 
domination, other controls) 
• Did not expose engineers to MRR-relevant information 
Controlee  
• lacked behavioral change 
• Were confused about the MRR (i.e., means-ends relationship) 
and persisted with behavioral patterns that were ineffective for 
product auditing 
E2 Controller  
• used commands to control 
• imposed interpretation 
• Issued commands and demanded responses 
• Disallowed individual interpretation of the MRR regardless of 
situational contingencies 
Controlee  
• worked around control 
• monitored by others 
• Disagreed over responsibilities and performed tasks perfunctorily 
• Relied on the product engineer for guidance and evaluation 
E3 Controller  
• mechanically applied control 
• Mechanically applied the MRR and punished engineers for what 
they had little influence on 
Controlee  
• developed extrinsic motivation 
• depleted capacity 
• a self-protective culture emerged 
• Applied the MRR to avoid blame or waive responsibilities 
• Applied limited energy to respond to frequent review requests 
• Mistrusted peers (e.g., designers) 
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